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nounces this type of person, the woman he knew who went about tell-
ing everybody how wrong the trial was but could give no reasons; in
fact she had not even taken the trouble to read Frankfurter's book. 5
The written critiques of the trial are mostly hypercritical analyses-a
nick here and a nick there, followed by sweeping conclusions.
Montgomery's book has lasting clinical value in its elaborate citation
and analysis of the multitudinous assaults on the trial. It shows that
fault can be found in all human testimony, particularly if there is in-
centive enough and money enough to stage the campaign. The case was
really tried three times, once by the jury, next by the Governor and
Joseph Wiggin, his eminent legal adviser, and lastly by a committee
composed of the President of Harvard, the President of M.I.T. and a
judge. We agree with Professor Samuel Williston that rarely, if ever,
have defendants in a criminal case been so repeatedly and unanimously
convicted by such competent tribunals.7
The book, in the end, leaves us with an abiding confidence that no
miscarriage of justice occurred and that the judicial processes of de-
mocracy are still respectable and secure.
WiLLiAm J. HUGHES, JR.*
FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND HISTORIAN: SELECTIONS FROM HIS
WRITINGS. Edited by Robert Livingston Schuyler. University of California
Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1960. Pp. 261. $1.50.
In the last few years there has been a rebirth of intense interest in
the life and writings of Frederic William Maitland. In 1957 Maitland's
daughter Ermengard wrote her personal tribute to her father in a short
but moving portrait published by the Selden Society.1 In the same year
Professor Warren 0. Ault of Boston University published "The Mait-
land-Bigelow Letters." Although mostly personal in nature, the letters
afford deep insight into Maitland's scholarly habits as well as presenting
his own views on his works. Frederic William Maitland Reader by Pro-
fessor V. T. H. Delany of Queen's University of Belfast published in
76 Phillips, op. cit. supra note 72, at 204.
76 Professor Williston's view was set forth in a biography in the late 1940's. Yeomans,
Abbott Lawrence Lowell 491 (1948).
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
1 E. Maitland, F. W. Maitland, A Child's-Eye View (1957).
2 Ault, The Maitland-Bigelow Letters, 37 B.U.L. Rev. 285 (1957).
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1957 is a collection of selected writings by and about Maitland.8 Profes-
sor Helen M. Cam's Historical Essays (1957)" is perhaps the first real
attempt, by means of a brilliant Introduction, to place some choice essays
by Maitland in their historical perspective. In this respect, Professor
Cam's work differs substantially from both the Delany book and Robert
Livingston Schuyler's Frederic William Maitland Historian--Selections
from His Writings published last year.
In his presidential address before the American Historical Association
in 1951, Robert Livingston Schuyler spoke of Frederic William Mait-
land as the one historian who "has meant more to me than any other...
not primarily for the subjects he dealt with, but for his methods, his
insights, and his superb historical sense."5 Nine years have passed since
his address was given, yet the publication of Frederic William Maitland
Historian is testimony to the continued reverence in which Maitland is
held by the contemporary historian.
In his Introduction the author has relied heavily on his 1951 address.
Rather than adopting Professor Cam's technique of using the Introduc-
tion as an explanation of the writings selected by the editor (or indicat-
ing why certain selections were chosen over others), Schuyler presents
a biographical sketch followed by an excellent general essay on Mait-
land as an historian. Even though the Introduction may not be fully
integrated with the selections, when compared with the Cam book this
paperback edition is a gem.
Maitland's writings total about 140 items including reviews, articles
in learned journals, his Selden Society publications and his major
volumes.6 Professor Schuyler has chosen passages from those works of
Maitland that have received the widest acclaim, using chapter headings
for classification purposes.7
3 The Delany book follows the pattern of the other Readers (e.g., The Holmes Reader,
The Marshall Reader, The Brandeis Reader and the Alexander Hamilton Reader) pub-
lished by Oceana Publications.
4 Cam, Selected Historical Essays of F. W. Maitland (1957).
5 Schuyler, The Historical Spirit Incarnate: Frederic William Maitland, 57 Am. Hist.
Rev. 303 (1952).
6 For a bibliography of Maitland's writings see Delany, Frederic William Maitland
Reader 235-42 (1957).
7 Schuyler has included selections from: Introduction to Memoranda de Parliamento
(1893), The History of English Law before the Time of Edward I (1895), Domesday
Book and Beyond (1897), English Law and the Renaissance (1901), Pleas of the Crown
for the County of Gloucester (1884), Praerogativa Regis (1891), Why the History of
English Law Is Not Written (1888), Township and Borough (1898), The Suitors of the
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If one were to ask what Maitland's chief impact on scholarship has
been, we should, I suppose, say that Maitland brought law to bear on
history and history to bear on law.' To Maitland, "the history of law
was not a specialised subsection of the history of England; it was an
integral part of it; it was the key to the whole story."9 "Whether we
like it or not," Maitland wrote, "the fact remains that, before we can
get at the social or economic kernel of ancient times, we must often
peel off a legal husk that requires careful manipulation.' 01
Maitland felt that law was in history. He emphasized the danger of
imposing legal concepts of a later date on facts of an earlier time." He
protested against reading either law or history backwards. Conversely
Maitland abhorred selecting a legal concept from the past and applying
it to a present situation without regard to the setting in which it was
originally born. In this he found the major difference between the
historian and the lawyer. Maitland wrote:
[W]hat is really required of the practising lawyer is not, save in the rarest cases,
a knowledge of medieval law as it was in the middle ages, but rather a knowledge
of medieval law as interpreted by modem courts to suit modem facts. A lawyer
finds on his table a case about rights of common which sends him to the Statute
of Merton. But is it really the law of 1236 that he wants to know? No, it is
the ultimate result of the interpretations set on the statute by the judges of
twenty generations. The more modem the decision the more valuable for his
purpose. That process by which old principles and old phrases are charged
with a new content, is from the lawyer's point of view an evolution of the true
intent and meaning of the old law; from the historian's point of view it is almost
of necessity a process of perversion and misunderstanding. Thus we are tempted
to mix up two different logics, the logic of authority, and the logic of evidence.
What the lawyer wants is authority and the newer the better; what the historian
wants is evidence and the older the better. This when stated is obvious; but
often we conceal it from ourselves under some phrase about "the common law."' 2
An eminent contemporary history professor, George 0. Sayles of
Aberdeen (Scotland), has said much the same thing:
County Court (1888), Introduction to Select Passages from the Works of Bracton and
Azo (1895), Introduction to The Mirror of Justices (1894), Introduction to Year Books
of Edward II, Vol. I (1905), Introduction to Year Books of Edward II, Vol. III (1906),
and Elizabethan Gleanings (1900).
8 Cam, op. dt. supra note 4, at xi.
9 Id. at x.
10 3 Maitland, Collected Papers 459 (1911).
11 "[Alny one who really possesses what has been called the historic sense must, so it
seems to me, dislike to see a rule or an idea unfitly surviving in a changed environment.
An anachronism should offend not only his reason, but his taste." Id. at 486.
12 Schuyler, Frederic William Maitland Historian 137 (1960).
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The lawyer is not in consimili casu: for the most part he does not need to know
what the law used to be or even how it came to be what it is. The truth he
seeks is contemporary to himself, the law as it is today, and if only he can
ascertain that, then he may rest content.' 3
Perhaps lawyers deserve Professor Sayles' gentle rebuke that they are
interested in some venerable doctrine only to the extent that they feel
compelled to find the last case that interpreted it. The fact of the
matter is, for example, that the history of procedural reform in the
Anglo-American legal system gives ample evidence of, if anything, an
excessive attachment to the past. 4 However, should we as lawyers sub-
scribe to a view which in essence asserts that lawyers can function in-
dependently of a sense of history?
A knowledge of legal history is important to the practitioner. The
lawyer can use legal history to illustrate that a current legal concept
was established in response to necessities which have now disappeared
or been greatly modified and should therefore no longer be applied. 5
Legal history can indicate that a contemporary legal rule now regarded
as "established" is not of ancient lineage but originated in fairly recent
times by way of judicial aberration; or that a general rule has evolved
not by common-law principles but by a process of "legal metamorpho-
sis. 
6
For those of us who wish to see the tradition of Maitland, Pollock
and Holdsworth transplanted here, wide use in the law schools of
Schuyler's paperback collection of Maitland's essays is-in view of the
bleak spectre of contemporary indifference by the American law schools
to legal history--encouraging and welcome.
It was Maitland's dream that law students study legal history.'7 At
Cambridge University, Maitland's alma mater, his vision has in some
degree been realized. Unfortunately in this country law schools
primarily teach current practice and doctrine. As Judge Wyzanski has
'3 Sayles, The Court of King's Bench in Law and History 3 (1959).
14 See generally, Bodenheimer, The Inherent Conservatism of the Legal Profession,
23 Ind. L.J. 221 (1948).
15 See, e.g., the history of the rule limiting the admissibility of a confession of a crime
in 3 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 817-20, 865 (3d ed. 1940).
16 See Professor Steffen's discussion of the general rule which requires "a servant or
other agent to indemnify his master or principal who has paid damages to a third person
injured by the unauthorized tort of the servant or agent," Restatement, Restitution § 96,
comment a (1937), in Steffen, The Employer's "Indemnity" Action, 25 U. Chi. L. Rev.
465, 471-72 (1958).
17 Schuyler, op. cit. supra note 12, at 141-42.
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pointed out, "[H]istory is a negligible part of the required reading....
We no longer believe either that the forms of action do, or that they
should, rule us from the grave."'8 And the bald and unhappy truth is
that perhaps we no longer care.
SANFORD N. KATz*
GOVERNMENT LITIGATION: CASES AND NOTES. By David Schwartz and
Sidney B. Jacoby. The Law Schools of Georgetown University and New York
University, Washington and New York, 1960. Pp. xxviii, 456. $7.50.
An invitation to review a book gives one an interesting choice: he
may use the opportunity to vent some pet ideas more or less pertinent
to the subject of the book, or he may resist the temptation and tell
what the book is about. I shall describe the book.
Although it has been estimated that in one-fourth of the cases on
the civil dockets of the federal courts the United States is a party,
lawyers tend to regard government litigation as a mysterious specialty
hardly resembling the ordinary grist of the judicial mill. This case
book, assembled by two whose qualifications as specialists are beyond
dispute, illuminates the unique features of actions by or against the
Government. At the same time, however, it gives the generalist a new
perspective and a measure of assurance by pointing out the many
similarities between Government and private litigation.
The authors modestly disclaim any purpose to elucidate procedure,
for the stated reason that books already exist which do this; but en-
passant they teach important lessons in federal procedure, and par-
ticularly furnish useful hints of practical wisdom pertaining to out of
court negotiations with government officials. Materials along this line
are not readily found in textbooks on federal procedure. In fact, I
regard as extremely valuable the opening chapter which explains the
organization of the Department of Justice and other agencies, the
functions of United States Attorneys and others in various types of
cases, limitations on attorneys' fees arrangements and illustrations of
the "square corners" a person must turn when he deals with the
Government.
When may a plaintiff sue in the district court, when must he go to the
Court of Claims, and when should he resort to the Comptroller Gen-
eral for relief? And when, in litigating with the United States, is he
18 Wyzanski, History and Law, 26 U. Chi. L. Rev. 237, 239-40 (1959).
* Assistant Professor of Law, The Law School, Catholic University of America.
19611 BOOK R~vi~ws
